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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2a-
(3)(2)(h) (2004). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. The trial court properly determined that parties to a divorce are entitled to 
limit or eliminate their right to seek modification of an existing alimony award that was 
the product of a settlement agreement between the parties. 
Standard of Review: "A trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed for 
correctness." Onglnt'l U.S.A. Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993); see 
also IHCHealth Sews. Inc. v. D & KMgrnt, Inc., 2003 UT 55 f 6, 73 P.3d 320 (noting 
that under the proper circumstances, the issue of waiver may be decided through summary 
judgment); Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc, 857 P.2d 935, 940 n.l (Utah 
1993) (noting that the issue of waiver could, under the proper circumstances, be 
determined as a matter of law). This issue was preserved for review by Appellee's Brief 
Re: Modification of Issues Raised at January 22, 2006 Hearing on [Appellee's] Motion to 
Dismiss. [R. 157]. 
2. The trial court acted within the limits of its authority when it determined 
that Appellant had failed to present evidence sufficient to support his alleged claim of a 
change in circumstances. 
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Standard of Review: The court of appeals reviews a trial court's denial of a 
petition to modify an existing alimony award for abuse of discretion. See Bollinger v. 
Bollinger, 2000 UT App 47, ^ 10, 997 P.2d 903. This issue was preserved for review by 
Appellee's Motion to Dismiss Respondent's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce and its 
supporting Memorandum. [R. 119-26]. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no constitutional or statutory provisions that are determinative on this 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In March 2000, Appellee Kallie J. Sill ("Kallie") filed a petition to end her 
eighteen year marriage to Appellant Joel Gordon Sill ("Joel"). [R. 1]. The parties both 
retained counsel, and after protracted negotiations, they entered into a global settlement 
agreement that was subsequently adopted in whole by the trial court. [R. 94, 103]. 
Pursuant to the settlement, Joel was obliged to pay Kallie alimony in the amount of 
$6,000.00 every month for a period often years. [R. 94 at ^ 13]. Additionally, each party 
agreed to waive their right to modify the terms of the settlement, which included terms 
favorable to both parties, and which was the product of informed and protracted 
negotiations. [R. 94 at ^ 20]. But, contrary to the terms of the settlement agreement, in 
September 2005, Joel petitioned the trial court for modification of the terms of the 
parties' alimony agreement. [R. 113]. After Kallie directed the trial court's attention to 
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the waiver provision of the settlement agreement, as well as to the obvious absence of 
anything that would support a conclusion that Joel's circumstances had substantially and 
materially changed, the trial court denied Joel's motion and dismissed the claim. [R. 182]. 
Joel now appeals. [R. 188]. 
BACKGROUND 
In March 2000, after eighteen years of marriage, Appellee Kallie J. Sill ("Kallie") 
and Appellant Joel Gordon Sill ("Joel") decided to end their relationship and Kallie filed 
a Divorce Petition in the Third District Court of Summit County. [R. 1]. Each party 
retained competent counsel and after protracted negotiations, Kallie and Joel agreed to the 
terms of a settlement, which disposed of all of the issues material to the divorce. [R. 76, 
94]. Through the settlement, the parties agreed, in effect, to split the marital assets, 
including the value of any real property that the parties had obtained while married and 
Joel's accumulated retirement accounts. [R. 94 at f 3]. The parties also agreed to a 
formula for the distribution of any proceeds realized through the eventual sale of the 
marital home, which was being built when the relationship ended. [R. 94 at *|flf 3(f), (g), 
(i), 8, 9]. During the marriage, Joel had accrued rights to certain royalty payments that 
had yet to be paid, and the parties agreed to divide these equally as they were received. 
[R. 94 at % 11]. Joel agreed to assume certain debt and both parties agreed to take all 
actions necessary to implement the provisions of the decree, including an agreement to 
jointly file their 2000 tax return and share in any tax liability for that year. [R. 94 at ffif 14, 
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17, 18]. Finally, the parties agreed to the terms of alimony that Joel would provide Kallie. 
[R. 94 at 1f 13]. 
Although the parties had been married for eighteen years, Kallie agreed that the 
alimony should run for only ten years, and Joel agreed to pay her $6,000.00 per month 
over that period. [R. 94 at *f 13]. The parties specifically agreed that the alimony 
payments would cease if Kallie either remarried, cohabitated, or died before the end of 
the agreed upon alimony term. [R. 94 at f^ 13]. However, to ensure that Kallie would 
receive the entire alimony amount, Joel agreed to obtain a life insurance policy, naming 
Kallie as the sole beneficiary, in the principle amount of $750,000.00, which 
approximated the amount of alimony that Joel was expected to pay over the term of the 
agreement. [R. 94 at U 15]. The settlement further provided that only after Joel had 
complied with all of the terms of the settlement agreement, including payment of all 
alimony, would he be permitted to either cancel the policy or name a different 
beneficiary. [R. 94 at ^ 15]. Having agreed to all of the terms material to the final 
dissolution of the marriage, the parties then decided to make the agreement permanent; 
therefore, they agreed to waive all rights to modify any of the terms of the agreement 
once it had been accepted by the trial court. [R. 94 at ^ 20]. Specifically, paragraph 
twenty of the settlement states, "[t]he provisions of this Decree of Divorce shall be non-
modifiable with the sole exception that if all of the assets have not been disclosed and 
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divided in this agreement, those may be brought back before the Court for appropriate 
disposition." [R. 94 at ^ 20] (emphasis added). 
The parties made no mention in the settlement agreement of Joel's income at the 
time of the divorce or his historic income. Nor did the parties discuss Kallie's income or 
her ability to produce income. Instead, the entire settlement agreement focused on the 
parties' assets, including existing and expected liquid assets. In fact, the terms of the 
alimony agreement do not appear to be based on any need versus ability analysis. The 
trial court, after reviewing the terms of the settlement agreement-including the alimony 
agreement-and the parties' pleadings and disclosures, adopted the settlement agreement 
in whole, including the waiver provision, on March 6, 2001. [R. 94]. 
Both parties complied with all of the terms of the agreement until September 13, 
2005, when Joel filed a Petition to Modify the Divorce Decree with the district court. [R. 
113]. Through this petition, Joel asked the court to reduce the amount of alimony that he 
had agreed to pay, asserting without reference to any supporting facts that he had 
experienced a substantial decrease in income since the decree was entered. [R. 114 at f 
4]. Kallie moved to dismiss, arguing not only that Joel failed to present the court with 
any grounds that would support modification, but also that the parties-both of them-had 
waived the right to modify any of the terms of the settlement, including the terms of the 
alimony agreement. [R. 119, 157]. The court, after reviewing substantive pleadings 
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submitted by both parties, agreed with Kallie and dismissed Joel's Petition. [R. 182]. Joel 
now appeals. [R. 188]. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Under Utah law, every competent and informed individual is entitled to waive 
virtually any substantive right, whether constitutional or statutory. The rights subject to 
waiver range from the right to counsel to the right to appeal an adverse decision. 
Moreover, the right to seek modification of the terms of an agreed-upon alimony award is 
also subject to waiver, and Utah courts have recognized and enforced such wraivers. 
Utah's position agrees with the position of most, if not all, of her sister states, where it 
has been generally accepted that a party to a stipulated divorce agreement is fully 
empowered and permitted to waive his right to seek modification of the terms of the 
settlement agreement, even when the agreement includes an alimony award. 
Under Utah law, as well as the law of Utah's sister states, waiver will be found 
when a party has a right, knows of the right, and intentionally waives his or her right to 
exercise that right. Here, it is undisputed that under Utah law parties have the right to 
petition a court to modify an alimony award if the circumstances warrant the 
modification. It is equally undisputed that at the time the parties entered into the 
settlement agreement, they were each aware that under Utah law they had the right to seek 
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modification should there be a substantial and material change of the parties' 
circumstances.1 Finally, Joel has never argued that in signing the settlement agreement 
and presenting it to the trial court he did not intend to waive his right to modify the 
alimony terms. Moreover, the terms of the agreement are clear, and under paragraph 
twenty of the stipulated decree, both parties agreed to waive the right to modify any of the 
terms of the agreement, which clearly includes the terms of the alimony agreement. 
Consequently, Joel's settlement waiver satisfies each of the elements required under Utah 
law and the trial court properly concluded that he had waived the right to seek 
modification. 
Additionally, even if no waiver existed in this case, Joel has abjectly failed to 
present the court with any facts to support his claim that his income substantially 
decreased between the time of the decree and 2005. To successfully plead a petition to 
modify, at a minimum, Joel must present the court with facts showing a material, 
substantial change in circumstances. Here, he pleaded no facts at all; instead he presented 
the court with a bald and unsupported conclusory statement that his income had 
substantially decreased. When faced with a motion to dismiss highlighting this failure, 
1
 Joel did not argue before the trial court, and has made no effort to argue 
here, that he was unaware of this right at the time he entered into the settlement. 
Moreover, at all times relevant to this proceeding, Joel has been represented by competent 
and qualified counsel who advised him at every step in the process. Thus, it should be 
presumed that Joel was aware of his statutory right to modify the alimony terms when he 
chose to waive that right. 
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rather than amend his pleading or attempt some other avenue of repair, Joel maintained 
that his assertion was facially sufficient. In the absence of any facts supporting the claim, 
the court properly dismissed Joel's petition. 
ARGUMENT 
Utah has long permitted parties to waive their substantive statutory and 
constitutional rights, including the right to seek modification of the terms of an alimony 
agreement. Further, many of Utah's sister states follow a similar rule, with the caveat for 
all being that the waiver must be made knowingly and intelligently. In this case, the 
parties stipulated to the disposition of all matters concerning their divorce, including the 
amount and duration of the alimony award. They then agreed to waive any and all right 
to modify any element of the stipulated decree, including alimony, and the trial court, 
after examining the stipulation, adopted the stipulation as its order. Consequently the trial 
court did not err in dismissing Appellant's Motion to Modify. 
Moreover, assuming that the parties had not waived the right to seek modification, 
as the petitioner, it was incumbent upon Appellant to plead sufficient facts to support his 
alleged substantial material change in circumstances. Instead, he merely asserted in his 
complaint that his income was "substantially reduced" from the time of the decree. This 
is materially insufficient, and the trial court acted well within its discretion in dismissing 
his claim as lacking any evidentiary basis. 
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I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT 
THE PARTIES HAD AFFIRMATIVELY WAIVED THE 
RIGHT TO MODIFY THE TERMS OF THE DECREE 
Joel argues that Utah law prohibits the waiver of the right to modify an agreed-
upon alimony award, and that as such, the trial court erred in dismissing his Petition to 
Modify. However, Joel is incorrect. 
Utah has long allowed competent adults to waive substantive statutory and 
constitutional rights, and this includes allowing parties who agree to the terms of a 
divorce settlement to waive the right to seek modification. Moreover, Utah's position 
reflects the position adopted in most, if not all, of Utah's sister states and there is no 
rational public policy reason to treat the waiver of the right to modify differently from the 
waiver of any other substantive right. 
A. Utah Has Long Recognized that Adults Have the Right to Affirmatively 
Waive Substantive Statutory and Constitutional Rights 
Although Joel insists that waiver is not permitted in this context, his position is 
unsupported. Utah courts have long recognized a party's ability to waive the right to 
modify the terms of an alimony award contained in a stipulated divorce decree, and Joel's 
assertion of a contrary position is simply incorrect. Perhaps most instructive on this issue 
is Kinsman v. Kinsman. See 748 P.2d 210 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In Kinsman, the parties 
agreed to the terms of a settlement agreement, which addressed all of the material aspects 
of their divorce, including a provision wherein the petitioner waived her right to alimony. 
See id. at 211. The parties presented the settlement agreement to the court and the court 
-9-
adopted the agreement as its decree of divorce. See id. at 211. Within the settlement 
agreement, the parties included the following provision: 
"The parties hereby stipulate and agree that each party is a fit 
and employable person capable of supporting himself and 
herself respectively and that neither party is entitled to 
alimony and both parties hereby waive the same now and 
forever." 
Id. at n.l (quoting language from the parties' stipulated divorce Decree). After the 
divorce was final, the petitioner asked the court to modify the terms of the decree to 
include alimony. See id. The petitioner argued that due to the respondent's declaration of 
bankruptcy, and the effects of that action, there had been a substantial, material change in 
circumstances warranting modification, even though the petitioner had waived any 
present or future right to alimony. See id. The trial court, without commenting on the 
decree's waiver provision, granted the petitioner's motion. See id. On appeal, the court 
of appeals chastised the trial court, stating that it "decline[d] to hold that a change of 
circumstances can overcome a knowing and specific waiver in a stipulation." Id. at 212. 
The court explained that uto base the award of alimony on changed circumstances ignores 
the finality of the terms of the stipulation which should only be overturned 'with great 
reluctance and for compelling reasons.'" Id. at 212 (quoting Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248, 
1251 (Utah 1980)). The court further explained that if a party were allowed to overcome 
its agreements by claiming that a "change in circumstances" has occurred, "[njothing 
would prevent a party from negotiating a favorable settlement in exchange for a waiver 
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. . . and sometime later, having enjoyed the benefit of the agreement and having dissipated 
the assets awarded, coming back to the court to [modify the agreement]." Id. at n.2.2 The 
court then proceeded to examine the settlement agreement as it would any contract. See 
id. at 212. Using this analytical structure, the court affirmed the trial court's decision, but 
only because the defendant had failed to perform the condition precedent necessary to 
trigger the agreement's waiver provision. See id. at 212-13. 
Similarly, in Reese v. Reese, the Utah Supreme Court held "that spouses or 
prospective spouses may make binding contracts with each other and arrange their affairs 
as they see fit, insofar as the negotiations are conducted in good faith . . . and do not 
unreasonably constrain the court's equitable and statutory duties'" 1999 UT 75, \ 25, 984 
P.2d 987 (emphasis added). And more recently, this court, in Medley v. Medley, 
discussed waiver in the context of a stipulated divorce decree and held that the appellant 
"must show that [the appellee] knowingly and intentionally gave up the right to obtain 
support from him in the future." 2004 UT App 179, \ 8, 93 P.3d 847. Throughout its 
analysis, the Medley court recognized that parties to a stipulated divorce retained the 
ability to waive their substantive rights and that this ability was not precluded merely 
2
 The court did, however, determine that the stipulation was void for failure 
of a condition precedent, and thus it relieved the Appellee of her obligation to perform 
under the stipulation. See Kinsman v. Kinsman, 748 P.2d 210, 213 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
This holding, however, has no application here, because the parties included no provision 
in the Decree that remotely resembles a condition precedent. Consequently, Kinsman 
provides no avenue of relief for Appellant in this case. 
-11-
because of their status as parties to a divorce. See id. Thus, there is no question that 
under Utah law that divorcing parties are permitted to waive their substantive right to 
modify a stipulated divorce decree. 
Additionally, outside of this context, Utah courts have accepted that any competent 
party has the right to waive virtually any substantive statutory and constitutional right. 
See United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, 
533 Utah Adv. Rep. 21; State v. Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, 137 P.3d 716; Lucero v. Kennard, 
2005 UT 79, 125 P.3d 917; State v. Lara, 2005 UT 70, 124 P.3d 243; 438 Main Street v. 
Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, 99 P.3d 80; In re Estate of Flake, 2003 UT 17, 71 P.3d 589; 
McCoy v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 2001 UT 3, 20 P.3d 901; see also Bluemel v. State, 
2006 UT App 141, 134 P.3d l&l; Aspenwood, L.L.C v. C.A.T., LLC, 2003 UT App 28, 
73 P.3d 947; State v. Valencia, 2001 UT App 159, 27 P.3d 573; Badger v. Madsen, 896 
P.2d 20 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); State v. Cornejo, 2006 UT App 215, 138 P.3d 97. 
For example, in State v. Cornejo, the Utah Court of Appeals recognized that a 
criminal defendant could waive his or her right to a speedy trial, a substantive 
constitutional right, through his own actions or the actions of his attorney. See 2006 UT 
App 215 at Ylj 28, 31. In Lucero v. Kennard, the supreme court discussed a criminal 
defendant's ability to waive the right to counsel, and stated that "[a] court may not 
presume waiver of the right to counsel unless there is some evidence that the defendant 
affirmatively acquiesced to the waiver of counsel." 2005 UT 79 at *f 25. But, the court's 
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discussion made it clear that a criminal defendant was empowered to waive the right to 
counsel. See id. In Schultz v. State, the court of appeals recognized that a defendant is 
capable of waiving his right to appeal an adverse ruling, see 2006 UT App 105, fflf 9-10, 
132 P.3d 701, and in State v. Beckstead, the supreme court noted that a criminal 
defendant's guilty plea operates as a waiver of most substantive constitutional rights. See 
2006 UT 42, K 10, 557 Utah Adv. Rep. 66. See also Turville v. J&JProps., L.C., 2006 
UT App 305,1f 44, 556 Utah Adv. Rep. 24 (noting that under Utah law it is possible to 
waive the right to appeal by accepting the benefits of a judgment in his favor). 
Perhaps most important to this discussion is Soter's Inc. v. Deseret Federal 
Savings & Loan, in which the supreme court addressed Utah's waiver rules and created an 
integrated approach to be applied to all waiver cases. 857 P.2d 935 at 940-42. To 
accomplish its task, the Soter's court was forced to address several existing decisions that 
created what it described as different standards of proof. See id. at 939. The court traced 
the genesis of these different standards and concluded that waiver law had become 
"confused" in Utah. Id. Then, in an attempt to reconcile the confusion, the court 
admitted that errors had been made, and, after a brief discussion of the aforementioned 
errors, the court held "that there is only one legal standard required to establish waiver 
under Utah law." Id. at 942. Thus, in Utah, "[a] waiver is the intentional relinquishment 
of a known right. To constitute waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit or 
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advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it." Id? 
Since the issuance of the Soter 's decision, Utah courts have applied the Soter 's 
analysis to a number of cases, which involved a number of legal questions. In Jensen v. 
IHC Hospital, Inc., the supreme court applied the Soter's analysis to the question of 
whether the defendant had waived its right to assert a defense in a medical malpractice 
setting. 2003 UT 51, fflj 81-92, 82 P.3d 1076. In IHC Health Services v. D & K 
Management, Inc., the supreme court applied Soter's to determine whether the plaintiff 
had waived its right to enforce the default provision of its lease with the defendant. 2003 
UT 5, Y([ 7-9, 73 P.2d 320. In In re Estate o/Uzelac, this court applied the Soter's 
analysis to determine whether the personal representative of the estate had waived his 
right to claim "certain personal property." 2005 UT App 234, ffif 22-24, 114 P.3d 1164. 
But perhaps most illuminating are the statements that the supreme court made in In re 
Discipline of Alex, 2004 UT 81, 99 P.3d 865. In that case, the court was asked to 
determine whether an intervenor had "waived its right to seek reconsideration of the 
March 22 order when it stipulated to the trustee's possession of Alex's property in the 
context of the contempt hearing." 2004 UT 81 at Tf 20. However, although the court's 
discussion of waiver in that context is illuminating, more important to the analysis of this 
case is the language of the court wherein it articulated the broad application of Soter's, 
3
 The court also noted that "[ijn Utah, a distinct intent to waive must only be 
shown by a preponderance of the evidence." Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Assoc, 857 P.2d 935, 942 n.6 (Utah 1993). 
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stating, in effect, that when the issue involves the waiver of a substantive right, as 
opposed to a procedural right, the Soter 's analysis applies. 2004 UT 81 at f 21 n.2. 
Consequently, there is no question that Soter's represents the articulation of waiver law in 
Utah, and under Soter's and its progeny, the Soter's analysis is applicable whenever the 
court is asked to examine the waiver of a substantive right, such as the right to seek 
modification of an existing alimony award. 
The ability to waive substantive rights is well-established in Utah, and there exists 
no rational basis to preclude waiver of the right to modify an agreed-upon alimony award. 
Moreover, Utah courts have recognized the right to waive the power to seek modification, 
and Joel's argument to the contrary is simply incorrect. 
B. Utah's Position is Mirrored in Most, if Not All, Jurisdictions 
within the United States 
Mirroring the position adopted by the Utah courts, most, if not all, of Utah's sister 
states have accepted that competent parties to a stipulated divorce decree are empowered 
to waive their right to modify an alimony award, and that the agreements executed by 
those parties should be enforced. See In re Marriage of Thornton, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 380, 
383 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); In re Marriage ofChristin, 899 P.2d 339, 343 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1995); Bassett v. BassetU 464 So. 2d 1203, 1205-06 (Fla. Ct. App. 1985); Dimon v. 
Dimon, 204 S.E.2d 148, 149 (Ga. 1974); Staple v. Staple, 616 N.W.2d 219, 226-28 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2000); In re the Marriage ofGessner, 487 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1992); In re Marriage ofMdnnis, 110 P.3d 639, 642-43 (Or. Ct. App. 2005); 
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Degenhart v. Burriss, 602 S.E.2d 96, 97-98 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004); Nichols v. Nichols, 469 
N.W.2d 619, 622-23 (Wis. 1991). 
For instance, in In re Marriage ofMcInnis, the Oregon Court of Appeals was 
asked to review the effect of a stipulated divorce decree, which included the following 
provision: '"[a]ll spousal support payments as provided herein shall be non-modifiable.55' 
See 110 P.3d at 640 (alteration in original) (quoting from the parties5 settlement 
agreement). After describing the agreement, the Mclnnis court asserted that its analysis 
was founded on the principle that "[i]t is well established that the parties to a dissolution 
proceeding 'may and often do enter into separate agreements regarding the terms of 
dissolution."' Id. (citation omitted). "Once approved by the court. . . 'agreements entered 
into by the parties are to be enforced as a matter of public policy.55' Id. (citation 
omitted).4 The court then proceeded to address the question of "whether 
4
 In describing the nature of public policy, the court stated 
"'It is axiomatic that public policy requires that 
persons of full age and competent 
understanding shall have the utmost liberty of 
contracting, and that their contracts, when 
entered into freely and voluntarily, shall be held 
sacred and shall be enforced by courts of 
justice; and it is only when some other 
overpowering rule of public policy intervenes, 
rendering such agreements unfair or illegal, that 
they will not be enforced.'" 
In re Marriage of Mclnnis, 110 P.3d 639, 642-43 (Or. Ct. App. 2005). In general, public 
policy has been defined as '""the community common sense and common conscience, 
extended and applied throughout the state to matters of public morals, public health, 
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waiving the right to seek a modification of spousal support contravenes the statutory 
authority of the court." Id. at 645. The court noted that "[t]he waiver provision in this 
case has nothing to do with the authority of the court; rather, it involves only whether the 
parties may invoke it"; thus, such waivers neither implicate nor interfere with the trial 
court's general authority related to modification cases. Id. The court further noted that 
"adults with the capacity to do so generally are free to waive a panoply of rights, statutory 
and constitutional, so long as the waiver is knowing and intentional." Id. Then, after 
discussing the "panoply of rights" that Oregon allows a party to waive, the court 
concluded that "a waiver of spousal support is fully enforceable as long as the terms of 
the agreement as a whole are fair and equitable and the spouse is not without reasonable 
means of support." Id. Therefore, the court concluded, "'[a] provision providing that no 
alimony shall be paid will be enforced unless the spouse has no other reasonable source 
of support.'" Id. at 646-47 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
Similarly, in Loo v. Loo, although the Minnesota Supreme Court ultimately 
concluded that the parties had not waived the right to modify an alimony award, the court 
public safety, public welfare, and the like."'" Adams v. Green Mountain R.R. Co., 862 
A.2d 233, 235 (Vt. 2004) (citations omitted); see also Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sure. 
Co., 243 F.Supp. 2d 793, 796 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (defining public policy as "that general 
and well settled public opinion relating to man's plain, palpable duty to his fellowmen, having 
due regard to all the circumstances of each particular relation and situation"). Here, the parties 
entered into the settlement agreement freely and with the guidance of competent and capable 
legal counsel. The settlement was presented to, and adopted by, the court as its order. Neither 
party was coerced to enter into the agreement and both parties benefitted from the agreement. 
Consequently, there is no sound public policy reason to void the parties' agreement. 
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maintained "that a waiver of the statutory right to move for modification of spousal 
maintenance, if contained in a stipulation that a trial court has incorporated into a 
judgment and decree of marital dissolution, is enforceable." 520 N.W.2d 740, 740 (Minn. 
1994) (citing Karon v. Karon, 435 N.W.2d 501 (Minn. 1989)). The court further stated 
that 
[ajlthough Minn. Stat. § 518.64 provides that orders regarding maintenance 
may be modified upon a showing of one of several statutory factors, in 
Karon we held that a stipulation in which the parties expressly waive their 
rights to modify the maintenance terms of the judgment and decree is 
enforceable and that courts may not later modify the stipulated maintenance 
provision. 
Id. at 744 (citing Karon, 435 N.W.2d at 503). Thus, it is beyond dispute that Minnesota 
allows parties to a stipulated divorce decree to waive their right to seek a modification of 
the terms of their decree. 
In 2000, the Michigan Court of Appeals followed a similar approach in its waiver 
discussion contained in Staple v. Staple. See 616 N.W.2d 219 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000). In 
Staple, the court was "asked to decide if parties who negotiate a divorce settlement may 
forego [the] statutory right to petition the court to modify the alimony provisions and 
instead agree that the agreed-upon alimony provisions are final, binding, and 
nonmodifiable." Id. at 220. The court concluded that parties were indeed permitted to 
waive their right to modify an agreed-upon alimony award, see id., stating that "we opt to 
honor the parties' clearly expressed intention to forego the right to seek modification and 
to agree to finality and nonmodifiability." Id. at 223. The court grounded its decision on 
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its conclusion that Michigan's modification statute "does not [expressly] preclude the 
parties from waiving their rights to petition the court for modification," id. at 226, and the 
fact that the courts of Michigan have historically "enforced agreements to waive statutory 
rights," id. As a result, the Staple court concluded that "the statutory right to seek 
modification of alimony may be waived by the parties where they specifically forego their 
statutory right to petition the court for modification and agree that the alimony provision 
is final, binding, and nonmodifiable." Id. at 228.5 
Both Bassett v. Bassett, 464 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. Ct App. 1985), and Nichols v. 
Nichols, 469 N.W.2d 619 (Wis. 1991), also have held that parties to a stipulated divorce 
decree are permitted to waive their right to modify the terms of the agreement. In Bassett, 
the court reaffirmed that the law in Florida, and elsewhere, was clear: "the availability of 
statutory modification [of existing alimony awards] is indeed subject to being waived." 
5
 The Staple court noted that its decision 
advances several public policies[, including] (1) 
nonmodifiable agreements enable parties to structure package 
settlements, in which alimony, asset divisions, attorney fees, 
postsecondary tuition for children, and related matters are all 
coordinated in a single, mutually acceptable agreement; (2) 
finality of divorce provisions allows predictability for parties 
planning their postdivorce lives; (3) finality fosters judicial 
economy; (4) finality and predictability lower the cost of 
divorce for both parties; (5) enforcing agreed-upon provisions 
for alimony will encourage increased compliance with 
agreements by parties who know that their agreements can 
and will be enforced by the court[;and 6] the public policy of 
requiring individuals to honor their agreements. 
Staple v. Staple, 616 N.W.2d 219, 228 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000). 
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Bassett, 464 So. 2d at 1205. In Nichols, the court stated that the law as it exists in 
Wisconsin was clear, "the consent of the parties to nonmodifiable maintenance makes 
such a maintenance provision enforceable notwithstanding the provision [of Wisconsin 
law] that maintenance is always subject to modification." Nichols, 469 N.W.2d at 622. 
The court then found that because the appellant "received a benefit-one-half of the 
couple's assets" and because the appellee assumed the parties' debts, the waiver provision 
did not violate public policy. Id. at 625. 
Taken as a whole, it is clear that the majority of Utah's sister states agree with 
Utah and allow parties to a stipulated divorce decree to waive their statutory right to 
modify the terms of an agreed-upon alimony award. Such waivers do not, as a rule, 
violate public policy, nor do they implicate or circumvent trial court authority. Rather, 
courts around the nation view waivers simply as contractual provisions that, in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary, were freely and voluntarily adopted for the mutual 
benefit of the parties to the agreement. As such, where a stipulated settlement agreement 
contains language that clearly indicates that the parties intended to waive their 
modification rights, courts should enforce the waiver provision and parties should be 
estopped from attempting to seek modification. 
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C. The Trial Court Properly Interpreted the Decree as Including an 
Affirmative Waiver of the Parties' Right to Seek Modification of 
the Alimony Terms 
Examining the plain language of the stipulated divorce decree, through the lens of 
the aforementioned authority, it is clear that Joel affirmatively waived his right to modify 
the alimony terms and that he did so knowingly and intelligently. "Waiver is 'the 
intentional relinquishment of a known right.5" Hinckley v. Hinckley, 815 P.2d 1352, 1354 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Mont Trucking v. Entrada Indus., 802 P.2d 779, 781 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990) (additional citations omitted)). "To constitute waiver, there must be an 
existing right, benefit, or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to 
relinquish it."' United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain, 2006 UT 
35, |^ 22, 553 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (quoting Soter's Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 
857 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993)). "[T]he statutory right to seek modification of alimony 
may be waived by the parties where they specifically forego their statutory right to 
petition the court for modification and agree that the alimony provision is final, binding, 
and nonmodifiable." Staple, 616 N.W.2d at 228. So long as the parties waived their 
rights knowingly and intelligently, courts are instructed to hold them to the benefit of 
their bargains. See Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248, 1251 (Utah 1980). 
In Utah, it is settled law that "spouses . . . may make binding contracts with each 
other and arrange their affairs as they see fit, insofar as the negotiations are conducted in 
good faith . . . and [the contracts] do not unreasonably constrain the court's equitable and 
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statutory duties." Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, % 25, 984 P.2d 987. Moreover, Utah 
courts have expressly determined that spousal contracts, or contracts between soon to be 
ex-spouses, "are generally subject to ordinary contract principles." In re The Estate of 
Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343, 1351 (Utah 1994). Therefore, if the language within a stipulated 
divorce Decree demonstrates that the parties had a "meeting of the minds," Brown v. 
Brown, 744 P.2d 333, 335 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), superceded by rule on other grounds as 
recognized in Dayton v. Dayton, 2003 UT App 205U (Utah App. Jun 19, 2003), and is 
accompanied by valid consideration, the terms of the agreement that lead to the decree 
should be considered a valid and binding contract. See In re Beesley, 883 P.2d at 1351; 
see also Kinsman v. Kinsman, 748 P.2d 210, 212 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). "Consideration 
may be found 'whenever a promisor receives a benefit or where [a] promisee suffers a 
detriment, however slight.'" Id. Moreover, Utah courts have held that parties, through 
their contracts, are able to waive their "statutorily protected rights," if they do so in a 
clear and unmistakable fashion. Medley, 2004 UT App 179 at <|ffi 7-8. Under this 
authority, waiver will be found if it is clear that the parties to the contract "knowingly and 
intelligently" waived their rights. See id. at <[ 8; see also Kinsman, 748 P.2d at 212. Once 
the court determines that the parties' waiver was proper, "equity is not available to 
reinstate rights and privileges voluntarily contracted away simply because someone has 
come to regret the bargain made," Land, 605 P.2d at 1251, and courts will not interpose 
themselves to relieve a party-in this case Joel-the obligations and limitations that he 
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voluntarily assumed in the Decree. See Despain v. Despain, 627 P.2d 526, 528 (Utah 
1981). Finally, under clear Utah guiding law, "the underlying intent of the contract is to 
be gleaned from the instrument itself; only where the language is uncertain or ambiguous 
need extrinsic evidence be resorted to." Land, 605 P.2d at 1251; see also Webbankv. Am. 
Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, ffi[ 9-10, 54 P.3d 1139 (stating that "'if the 
language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties' intentions 
are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and the contract may 
be interpreted as a matter of law'" (citation omitted)). 
In the instant case, as a threshold matter, there is no dispute between the parties 
that they each had a statutory right to seek modification of the decree and that at the time 
that they entered into the agreement they were aware of this right. This is evidenced not 
only by Joel's failure to argue anything that would contradict this fact, but also by the 
language of the agreement, wherein the parties agreed to the terms that would terminate 
Kallie's right to alimony, and the agreement's plain reference to modification. [R. 97. at 
^ 13, 20]. Moreover, at no point during these proceedings has Joel asserted that he did 
not intend to waive the modification right; instead, his arguments have focused on 
attempting to show that such a waiver is impermissible under Utah law. Consequently, 
Joel has conceded the intent element of the waiver analysis, and in doing so, Joel's waiver 
of the right to modify should be recognized and enforced. 
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Moreover, assuming that Joel presented the trial court with some argument on any 
of the elements of waiver, given the clear circumstances surrounding his waiver, his 
arguments should be disregarded. When the decision to divorce was made, both parties 
retained legal counsel, and through said counsel, the parties entered into a protracted 
negotiation through which they hammered out all of the terms of the divorce. They 
agreed on the property distribution; they agreed to the distribution of the marital debt; and 
they agreed to take the necessary actions to ensure that all of the provisions of the 
agreement could be accomplished. [R. 97], They agreed that Kallie would receive 
alimony, which would be modified only upon her death, cohabitation, or remarriage. [R. 
97]. To limit Joel's responsibility, Kallie agreed that the duration of the alimony award 
would run only ten years-as opposed to the eighteen available to her due to the length of 
the parties' marriage-and to guarantee that Kallie would receive the entirety of the 
amount due to her under the agreement, Joel agreed to obtain a life insurance policy for 
the entire alimony amount and to name Kallie as the sole beneficiary. [R. 97 at 13, 15], 
Finally, after including language that settled all of the issues involved in the divorce, the 
parties agreed that "The provisions of this Decree of Divorce shall be non-modifiable 
with the sole exception that if all of the assets have not been disclosed and divided in this 
agreement, those may be brought back before the Court for appropriate disposition." [R. 
97 at T[ 20] (emphasis added). 
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Examining these facts through the lens provided by Utah's courts, it is clear that 
both Joel and Kallie understood that their divorce implied several substantive statutory 
rights, including the right to an equitable property distribution, the right to maintain 
premarital property, and Kallie's right to alimony. It is further clear that the parties 
understood that under Utah law the agreement alone would not settle the issues connected 
to these rights, and that either party was entitled to seek modification of any of the terms 
of the agreement unless the parties took action to foreclose those avenues. Thus, to 
ensure that the settlement agreement was the final expression of the terms of their 
divorce, and to foreclose any possible modification of the terms of the agreement, both 
Joel and Kallie intentionally and permanently waived any and all rights to modify the 
terms of the agreement, including the terms of the alimony agreement. Under generally 
accepted principles of contract law-and the plain language of the decree-it is clear that 
upon completion of the process, Joel and Kallie intended it to contain fixed terms that 
were not subject to modification, and that the parties deliberately, knowingly, and 
intentionally waived any right to modify the decree, including the alimony terms. 
Moreover, a brief examination of the Decree demonstrates that both parties 
received benefits from adopting the stipulation, and that both parties suffered some 
detriment, regardless of how slight, in adopting the stipulation. For instance, Kallie gave 
up her right to have the court distribute the marital property, and instead agreed to the 
property distribution contained in the Decree, without outside valuation, to facilitate the 
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stipulation. In addition, she agreed to limit the duration of her alimony award to a term of 
ten (10) years and waived her right to seek alimony for a period of time equal to the 
duration of the marriage, which lasted eighteen years. Similarly, Joel agreed to assume 
full responsibility for the loan that was necessary to complete the property distribution 
and to hold Kallie harmless should he default on the obligation. Finally, the stipulation 
was presented to the trial court, which had a duty to ensure that no provision in the 
Decree violated public policy. Consequently, the Decree, entered on March 6, 2001, was 
the embodiment of the intention of the parties, it comported with Utah law, and it did not 
violate public policy; therefore the settlement agreement should now be seen as an 
integrated, binding contract to which the parties agreed, and to which the parties should 
now be held. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN THE LIMITS OF ITS 
DISCRETION IN DETERMINING THAT THE APPELLANT 
FAILED TO SHOW ANY SUBSTANTIAL, MATERIAL 
CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES 
Even ignoring the existence of Joel's waiver of the right to seek modification of 
the terms of the alimony agreement, the trial court acted within its discretion in 
dismissing his petition. Joel abjectly failed to present the court with any facts that would 
have supported his claim that his income had substantially reduced over time. Joel's 
approach was fatal to his petition. When seeking to modify the terms of an existing 
alimony award, Joel is required to "first show that a substantial change in circumstances 
has occurred "c since the entry of the decree and not contemplated in the decree itself"'" 
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Bollinger v. Bollinger, 2000 UT App 47, If 11, 997 P.2d 903 (emphasis in original) 
(quoting Durfee v. Durfee, 796 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). Moreover, "[w]hile 
it is axiomatic that parties to a divorce decree will experience some type of economic 
change after the original divorce decree is entered," id. at \ 20, "[a] temporary . . . 
decrease in the payor's income does not necessarily constitute a substantial change." 
Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736, 739 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
In this case, the parties stipulated to the terms of the divorce after negotiating a 
settlement and relying on the advice of their respective attorneys. The settlement contains 
no reference to the rationale for the terms of the alimony agreement, and both the 
settlement document and the divorce Decree are devoid of any mention of the parties' 
then current incomes, Joel's ability to pay, and Kallie's need for alimony. Instead, the 
settlement largely focused on the distribution of the parties' marital assets, including both 
real and personal property, and it carefully identified the amount of the marital estate that 
was to be awarded to Kallie. In fact, the only information in the settlement that even 
remotely addresses income is found in paragraph eleven, where the parties agreed to split 
evenly all royalties that Joel was to receive for work performed during the marriage. [R. 
76, 97]. Thus, absent evidence not apparent in the settlement document or the decree of 
divorce, Joel's income level should not be considered material to the alimony issue. 
Instead, the alimony should merely be interpreted as the method chosen by the parties to 
recognize Kallie's contributions to Joel's career. Thus, because the parties' relative 
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incomes were not relevant to the terms of alimony, any purported change to Joel's income 
level could not form the basis of a successful petition to modify. 
Further, assuming that Joel's income is material to this discussion, Joel pleaded no 
facts- none at all-concerning his income, either at the time of the divorce or currently. In 
fact, a review of the record reveals that when the court was asked to enter a judgment 
concerning the parties' divorce, it was presented with the negotiated agreement in which 
the parties stipulated to the terms of the divorce. Joel's income was not discussed in that 
document. Similarly, when Joel filed his petition to modify, he presented the court with 
no evidence of his current income, but instead he merely asserted that his income "has 
substantially decreased." (R. 113). Thus, the court was presented with no facts 
concerning Joel's income. In the absence of any information concerning Joel's income, 
current or historical, Joel's bald and unsupported statement cannot support his petition. 
See generally Bollinger, 2000 UT App 47 at ^[11. The trial court, at Kallie's urging, 
recognized this fatal flaw and declined to entertain Joel's petition. Because its decision 
did not exceed the limits of its considerable discretion, this court should affirm the trial 
court's action. 
-28-
CONCLUSION6 
In Utah, it is settled law that a party is permitted to waive his substantive rights, so 
long as the waiver is intentional. This rule applies broadly to all substantive rights, 
including the right to seek modification of an agreed-upon alimony award. Moreover, 
Utah's position is not unique, but instead it mirrors the position on waiver adopted by 
most of her sister states. 
In this case, the uncontroverted evidence overwhelmingly supports a conclusion 
that Joel waived his right to seek modification of the stipulated terms of alimony. 
Through a protracted and intense negotiation, with the assistance of competent counsel, 
Joel agreed to each and every term that was eventually included in the settlement 
agreement. From the plain language of the settlement, it is clear that Joel understood he 
had the right to seek modification, but chose to waive that right to conclude the 
settlement. Thus, the trial court correctly denied Joel's petition to modify. 
Moreover, ignoring Joel's waiver, he failed to present the court with any facts that 
could be used to support his claim that his income had substantially reduced since the 
time of the divorce. Instead, he merely asserted, without support, that his income had 
decreased. He made no reference to his current income level or to his income level at the 
time of the divorce. Moreover, he made no effort to demonstrate factually that his income 
6
 Kallie also renews her request for an award of her costs and fees, which she 
placed before this court in her Motion for Summary Disposition, filed April 20, 2006, on which 
this court reserved decision pending its plenary review on May 23, 2006. 
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levels were material to the terms of the alimony agreement as drafted. Consequently, the 
trial court properly denied the Appellant his desired relief. 
Accordingly, this court should affirm the trial court's decision. 
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